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,EmoloyrrentandtheThreat of Collective ActionbyWorkers
ABSTRACT
Formany reasons a group of workers may have sufficient bargaining power to
claim for themselves some share of any monopoly surplus earned by an enterprise
and (in the short run) a share of the return on fixed assets. This paper explores
the effect of the threat of collective action on wages and employment in firms
which wish to avoid collective bargaining with their employees.
The threat of collective action analyzed here is a stylized representation
of the institutional situation created by U.S. labor laws.If a firm wishes to
avoid collective bargaining it must choose wages and employment so that no co-
alition greater than or equal to a fixed fraction of its workforce can be formed
around a feasible bargaining agreement. The constraint this implies on employment
and wages is analyzed for several assumptions about how bargained surplus is
distributed among workers.It is found that the threat may affect only employ-
ment, or both wages and employment. For a firm with monopoly power a threat may
either increase or decrease employment. Effects on wages and employment are found
to be possible even in a market with price competition and free entry if firms
must make fixed investments to produce output. Even when union contracts are
efficient a threat of collective action can be expected to distort employment and
investment decisions.
If a threat causes firms to pay a wage above the reservation wage there will
be an excess supply of labor to the firm.Under certain conditions this may
manifest itself as involuntary unemployment. Further, unemployed workers will
be unable to bid wages down. Like efficiency wage models, the threat of collec-
tive action provides an explanation for industry wage differences and the dual
structure of the labor market. The model may also be able to provide some insight
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Workersacting collectively exercise more bargaining power than individuals.
This power can be used by groups of workers to claim for themselves some share
of any monopoly surplus earned by an enterprise and (in the short run) a share
of the return on fixed asset. This paper explores the effect of the threat of
collective action on wages and employment in firms which wish to avoid collective
bargaining with their employees.
In recent years economists have devoted a great deal of effort to the de-
velopment and testing of models of union wage and employment effects. Although
only a small percent of the workforce is organized by unions,1 it is often argued
that the conditions of employment in the union sector may affect those of the
non-union sector via a threat effect -- employerswishing to keep unions out must
match or come close to matching union wages. A primary purpose of this paper is
to present a formal theoretical framework for considering this contention.2
Another motivation for this research is the recent interest in efficiency
wagemodels3. These models have attracted attention because they provide
parsimonious explanations for the existence of involuntary unemployment, and why
different firms pay different wages for apparently identical workers. But, they
have come under attack either because they are based on the ad hoc assumption of
a normative wage or because the market imperfections which could give rise to
efficiency wages could be dealt with in a pareto efficient manner with other forms
of incentives such as bonding of workers or increasing age-earnings profiles.
The threat model solves many of the same empirical puzzles as efficiency wage
3models, but lacks some of the drawbacks. Like efficiency wage models, it can also
explain the existence of dual labor markets and might help explain discrimination
against minority workers in hiring in some jobs. Finally, the model may provide
an explanation for inertia, or the appearance of inertia in wage setting.
The presentation proceeds in five parts. Section I describes a model of a
firm facing the threat of unionization.Section II analyzes the model, demon-
strates the possible effects on wages and employment in a monopolistic and a
competitive industry. Section III considers how the threat of collective action
may help explain the behavior of wages over the business cycle. Section IV is a
conclusion which summarizes the results discusses some empirical evidence for the
relevance of the model and considers policy implications.
I. THE THREAT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.
For many reasons, including laws, social customs and diseconomies of scale
in training and hiring, workers acting collectively may wield the threat to shut
a business down. As a result they may be able to claim for themselves a share
of any monopoly rents accruing to the firm and, in the short run, some of the
return to any fixed assets owned by the firm. Consequently, firms may find it
profitable to avoid having to bargain collectively with their employees.De-
pending on the nature of the laws and customs it may be more or less easy to do
this. This section presents a model of a firm facing the threat of collective
action by its workers. The model is meant to be a stylized representation of the
situation faced by a modern U.S.firm.If a fraction v of a firm's workforce
4wishes to bargain collectively then the firm must do so.The fraction v could
be thought of as the majority that must vote to certify a union under the National
Labor Relations Act. Alternatively it could be thought of as being the smaller
fraction that must be mobilized and willing to work to organize the union or the
larger fraction of the workforce that must be sufficiently sympathetic to the idea
of collective bargaining to be willing to take part in a work stoppage or slow-
down.
It will be assumed that workers will not want to take part in collective
bargaining if they can not expect to negotiate a wage higher than the one they
currently receive.4 Each worker will also have to pay some cost to organize for
collective bargaining. This cost could include the time it takes to organize a
group of people and agree on collective goals, and/or the costs imposed by an
employer on workers who attempt to organize. The latter are limited by the law
and the employer's willingness to engage in and pay for anti-union actions. In
the model these costs Cc) will be assumed to be constant and equal for all
workers.5 The view that workers' predisposition towards the socialvalue of unions
affect their preferences for collective bargaining can also be incorporated into
the model through a reinterpretation of c. If workers put a high value on soli-
darity and the political role of unions then c would be small, conceivably nega-
tive at some times.If workers are averse to unions or collective bargaining c
would be larger. Workers and firms will be assumed to have perfect foresight
about the outcome of any actions they take. Workers will choose to bargain col-
lectively only if they know that the wage that they will be paid is greater than
their current wage plus c.
The firm is assumed to maximize profits and to face an infinitely elastic
supply of workers at a reservation wage r. One of the things agents are assumed
to know is the exact nature of all contracts workers could negotiate with the
5firm.A contract in this model will specify the level of employment, which
workers are employed, and how much each worker is paid.The set of possible
contracts is determined by technology, market conditions, the firm's initial
choice of the amount of capital, and the bargaining power of the parties. It will
be assumed to be given at the outset.6
By only specifying a set of possible contracts the question of how bargaining
outcomes are determined can be avoided for the most part. Workers may negotiate
efficient contracts or they may choose wage employment pairs on the labor demand
curve. Workers collectively may behave as if they had any type of preferences.
There is no need to specify a particular solution to the bargaining problem or
the form of the bargaining game. Nany results will only require minimal assump-
tions about the nature of the set of possible contracts.
The sequence of events in the model is as follows:
l.The firm chooses the number of workers it wishes to hire (L) and a wage for each
of the workers (w., il,. .. ,L).
2. If any possible contract is attractive to a coalition of a fraction of at least
v of all workers then collective bargaining is commenced. A contract will be
attractive to a worker if the wage offered is greater than the current wage by
at least c dollars -- anamount necessary to compensate the worker for the cost
he or she will have to incur to organize for collective bargaining. We will not
be concerned with which contract will be chosen if more than one is attractive
since we will only be examining cases where the firm acts to prevent any coalition
from forming.
63. If collective bargaining is chosen the firm will earn profits If it is
not the firm will earn ii=R(L,K)-Xw.,where R(L,K) represents the firms revenue
net of non-labor costs as a function of the number of workers employed and the
initial stock of capital.
Since all agents in the model have perfect information the firm knows when
it chooses the level of employment and wages whether or not it will have to bargain
collectively with its employees. It also knows what contract will be negotiated.
To finish the description of the model the general form of the set of possible
contracts must be specified. Once the decision is made to allow collective bar-
gaining the firm will care only about the level of employment and the wage-bill
--notthe wage being paid to each worker. Consequently, it is possible to divide
consideration of the types of contracts that will be offered into two parts.7
First, which wage-bill/employment combinations can be negotiated will be consid-
ered followed by the constraints firms and workers may face in distributing the
wage bill.
For analytical convenience two other assumptions will be made about the set
of possible employment/wage-bill pairs. Defining B(E,K) as the wage-bill which
can be negotiated as a function of the amount of labor employed (E), and the in-
itial capital stock of the firm (K), it will be assumed that for the values over
which B(E,K) is defined, for each value of K, B(E,K)/E and B(E,K)-rE have unique
maximums. These assumptions will be used to derive the form of the constraint
avoiding collective bargaining imposes on wages and employment.
With respect to how bargained agreements may distribute the wage bill there
are two considerations --canthe agreement discriminate in favor of the
pro-bargaining coalition and can it distribute income to unemployed coalition
members.8 Depending on the answers to each of these questions one of four sets
7of contracts can be offered given the B(E,K) locus.9 These possible contracts
determine the wage/employment constraints a firm must satisfy to avoid collective
bargaining.The determination of these constraints is described in the next
section.
II.WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT.
First,consider the case of a firm which is a monopoly. Since the firm knows
when it chooses employment and wages whether or not it will have to bargain col-
lectively with its workforce the firm's decision can be reduced to two steps.
In the first, the firm determines the maximum profit it can receive if it bargains
and if it does not. To determine the latter it must compute the level of wages
and employment which maximize profit subject to the constraint that no possible
contract will be preferred by a fraction v of the workers it hires. In the second
step the firm compares profits in the two cases and chooses to bargain or not
depending on which profit is larger. Since the concern here is with threat ef-
fects only the choice of employment and wages in the case where the firm decides
to avoid collective bargaining will be considerd.
The first thing to note about the firm's wage policy if it wishes to avoid
bargaining is that it will always minimize its total wage bill if it pays all
workers the same wage. This is because with identical workers those who are paid
the least will require the lowest wage to induce them to join the coalition. The
10 highest paid need not be included.
BIf the firm pays all workers the same wage the firm's task is to maximize
ir=R(L,K)-wL subject to w ￿ r and to the constraint that w is sufficiently large
so that no potential contract can pay vL workers w>w+c.
The constraint that the firm pay enough, given its employment level, to avoid
bargaining can be analyzed as follows. Consider first the situation where workers
may discriminate against those who are not members of the founding coalition and
may transfer income to members of that coalition even if they are not employed
by the firm after the adoption of the contract. In this case a coalition will
be able to form if there exists a feasible contract which allows vL workers to
be paid c more than the wage the firm is offering them if they are employed or
c-r more if they will not be employed (since if they are not employed they are
assumed to be able to earn the reservation wage r). If this is possible with any
contract it will be possible with the one which maximizes the difference between
the total wage bill for a given capital stock, and r times the number of workers
employed under that contract. By maximizing this total, the amount per member
of the fixed sized coalition is also maximized. Defining L as the number of
workers employed under that contract the value of L is that which maximizes
* *
B(L ,K)-rL given K. If the coalition negotiates this contract it can offer its
* *
members (B(L ,K)-rL )/vL + r.If vL < L then additional workers will be dis-
*
criminated against and paid only r. If vL > L some of the original coalition
* *
will be laid-off and paid only (B(L ,K)-rL )/vL. Since these workers can earn r
in other employment they will be indifferent between being laid-off and staying
on. Thus the firm must offer
* *
w ￿ (B(L ,K)-rL )/vL + r -c (1)
to avoid collective bargaining.
9If the bargained agreement can neither discriminate nor transfer income to
coalition members who are not employed, the contract which will be preferred if
any contract is will be the one which maximizes the wage bill per employed worker
subject to the constraint that all vL members of the coalition are employed. l1
In this way the agreement offers the highest possible wage to coalition members.
If we define Lt as the value of E for which B(E,K)/E is maximized and assume that
B(E,K) is non-increasing beyond Lt then the constraint on the wage the firm must
satisfy to avoid collective bargaining is
w ￿ B(E,K)/E -c where E =max(L',vL). (2)
The other two cases are hybrids of these two. If the agreement may discriminate
but can not specify transfers to workers who are not employed by the firm thewage
constraint the firm faces if it wishes to avoid bargaining is
w ￿ (B(E,K)-rE)/vL +r-cwhere E =max(L,vL). (3)
If agreements can specify transfers but cannotdiscriminate the constraint is
*
w￿ (B(E,K)-rE)/U +r-cwhere E =min(L,U) and U =max(L',vL).(4)
Figure 1 presents an example of the second type of constraint and shows its
derivation from the B(E,K) frontier.The figure shows that if agreements can
neither specify transfers nor discriminate the firm faces a constraint with a flat
segment between the origin and L'/v on the horizontal axis, and a downward sloping
segment beyond there. Of course the firm must offer a wage of at least r to hire
workers so beyond some point the avoidance constraint is not binding. The posi-
10tion of the constraint is found by identifying Lt/v. At that point the firm must
offer a wage of B(L',K)/Lt -cto avoid bargaining. Similar diagrams could be
drawn for the other three cases.
If the firm chooses to avoid bargaining it maximizes profit subject to the
constraint that the wage is greater than r and large enough to deter the formation
of a coalition. Figures 2 through 6 depict five different types of solutions to
this problem. Choices like point A in figure 2 will be observed when the cost
of forming a coalition (c) is very large, when the firms bargaining power would
keep any coalition from capturing a significant fraction of the its profits, or
when there are no profits for a coalition to capture. Then the firm pays the
reservation wage and sets employment so that the marginal revenue product is equal
to the reservation wage. In this case there is no threat effect.
In figure 3 at point B there is a threat effect on employment but not on wages.
Firms will choose wage-employment pairs of this sort when both the avoidance and
the reservation wage constraint are binding.In this case the firm is paying a
wage greater than the marginal revenue product of labor. Given its initial choice
of K, it is also hiring more workers than it would in the absence of a threat in
order to increase the size of the coalition that must form so as to reduce the
wage the coalition can offer. It is even possible that independent of the initial
choice of K employment is higher. For example, if the initial capital stock is
not an important determinant of bargained wages in the long run (which it might
not be in a growing industry) then we would expect employment to be higher in a
firm facing a threat of collective action such as that depicted in figure 3 than
in one which does not. Even if increasing the capital stock increases the wage
bill that a coalition could expect to obtain, and the firm under invests in cap-
ital, this effect need not dominate the increased employment the firm undertakes
to dilute the returns to organizing.
11Point C in figure 4 depicts a situation where there is a threat effecton
wages and employment. In the diagram the firm is facing the wage constraint for
when the coalition may both discriminate and make transfers. First ordercondi-







or the marginal revenue product of labor must equalr-c, and the marginal revenue
product of capital net of non-labor costs should equal the derivative of the
bargained surplus, with respect to capital, divided by the fraction of workers
necessary to form a coalition. Given K, employment is greater than it would be
in the absence of a threat and wages are above the reservationwage. This is the
situation depicted in in figure 4. The firm hires the additionalworkers to force
any potential coalition to distribute the surplus over a larger number of members
thus leaving a smaller surplus per potential member andmaking the formation of
a coalition less attractive. Depending on the sign and size of3S/3K and on the
cross partial derivative of revenue function with respect to labor andcapital,
12employment may be either greater or less than it would be in the absence of a
threat.
If the firm were facing the constraint where agreements involve neither
transfers nor discrimination, choices of wages and employment on the downward
sloping part of the constraint may or may not be possible depending on the nature
of the B(E,K) function)2 Point D in figure 5 depicts a situation where the
tangency exists. The wage is above the reservation wage. Again, employment may
be either greater or less than in the absence of a threat.
The last situation to be considered occurs when agreements may not specify
transfers to unemployed workers or discriminate in distributing the wage bill.
This may yield a choice such as point E in figure 6. A wage above the reservation
wage is paid and the marginal revenue product of labor is set equal to the wage.
The marginal net-revenue product of capital is set equal to L times the derivative
of the union wage with respect to the capital stock. Unless increasing the cap-
ital stock greatly increases employment and reduces the union wage, employment
will be lower with a threat than without.
In any of these cases where the wage is above the reservation wage, even those
where employment is greater than in the absence of a threat, there would be an
excess supply of labor and firms would refuse to hire additional workers at any
wage. Workers who attempted to bid the firms wage down would be unsuccessful
since the firm would fear that workers employed at a lower wage would attempt to
organize to take collective action.
This excess supply of labor may or may not manifest itself as unemployment.
If there were jobs in the economy which paid a competitive wage workers who could
not find employment in high wage threat avoidance jobs might be employed there.
However, if there was a binding minimum wage, if other jobs in the economy had
to pay an efficiency wage, if unemployed search for high wage jobs was more pro-
13ductive than search while employed in these competitively paid jobs, or if there
were workers whose reservation wages were above those paid in the competitive
sector but not those paid by some high wage employers unemployment would still
be a possibility.
The preceding describes the possible effects of a threat of collective action
in a firm which is earning monopoly profits. What will happen towages and em-
ployment for firms in a competitive market? To illustrate the possibility of a
collective action threat effect in this case consider the following model.
1.Any number of identical firms produce f(k) units of the same good with each
unit of labor and k dollars of capital per unit of labor (f'>O, f' '<0). Technology
is putty-clay so that once the firm purchases its capital it's maximum output is
determined
2. There is an infinitely elastic supply of labor at the reservationwage r.
3. Total market demand is a decreasing function of the minimum price charged by
any of the firms. All demand goes to the firm(s) offering the lowest price. If
there is more than one firm offering this price the demand is divided equally
between them.
4. After the firms make their scale, price and wage decisions and purchase capi-
tal, workers decide whether or not to engage in collective bargaining.If they
decide in favor of bargaining they negotiate a Nash bargain with the firm. If a
bargain is not reached workers earn a fraction of the reservation wage (ar) and
the firm receives the market value of its installed capital (dk) which is less
14than its pre-installation purchase price (d<l).In this case the Nash bargain
wage will be
Wc =b(pf(k)-dk)+(l-b)ar (5)
where p is the price charged by the firm and b is a constant between zero and one
which measures the workers' bargaining power. Before the workers may engage in
collective bargaining each must pay a cost c to organize.
With these assumptions Nash equilibrium requires that price be equal to cost
since with a higher market price any one firm could earn greater profits by cut-
ting its price slightly and increasing its market share. At lower prices firms
would earn negative profits. Firms must also chose the capital/labor ratio to
minimize unit costs or be driven out of business by those firms that do. Without
the fourth set of considerations the only Nash equilibrium for firms choosing
prices, wages, the capital/labor ratio and output is p =unitcost =(k+r)/f(k).
Firms choose k to minimize unit cost subject to the constraint that w￿r. Conse-
quently in equilibrium firms will choose w =r,pf'l, and output equal to market
demand divided by the number of firms. Adding the forth assumption can change
this.
Avoiding collective action imposes another constraint on a firm's choice of
wages and the capital/labor ratio. Now the firm minimize costs subject to the
additional constraint that
w ￿ w -c=bpf(k)-bdk+(l-b)ar-c (6)
=[b(l-d)k+(l-b)ar-c]/(l-b)
15where p=(k+w)/f(k) has been substituted into equation 5 to yield 6.With this
additional constraint there are three types of solutions to the cost minimization
problem.If the cost to workers of organizing (c) is large enough or their bar-
gaining power (b) is sufficiently small only the reservation wage constraint will
be binding and the possibility of collective action will not affect the market
equilibrium.
If both constraints are binding firms will lower their capital/labor ratios
so that workers hired at the reservation wage will have inadequate incentive to
organize. With the lower capital/labor ratio more workers will be required to
produce the same output, costs and prices will be higher, and less output will
be produced. Employment can be either higher or lower depending on the relative
size of the scale and substitution effects.
If only the bargaining avoidance constraint is binding then wages will be
set above the reservation wage, prices will be higher and output lower.The
capital/labor ratio may be either higher or lower (see appendix 1). Higher wages
might lead firms to substitute capital for labor. Decreasing the capital stock
decreases wages. Which effect dominates depends on a number of factors including
the extent to which capital costs are recoverable if the firm and workers dontt
reach a bargain (d), what workers receive if no bargain is reached (ar) and the
elasticity of substitution of capital for labor. If the capital/labor ratio is
lower, employment may be either greater or less than it would be in the absence
of a threat depending on the relative size of the scale effect of increasing
prices and the substitution effect as firms use less capital and more labor to
produce a unit of output. Independent of the effect on employment, with only the
collective action avoidance constraint binding, the wage will be above r and
workers willing to work for less will not be offered a job out of fear that they
16would then have the incentive to join in organizing to bargain. As noted above
this may or may not lead to the creation of involuntary unemployment.
Appendix 2 presents a numeric example where firms choose one of the three
types of solutions depending on the strength of workerst bargaining power. For
low values there is no threat effect. For intermediate values there is an effect
on the capital/labor ratio and employment, but not on the wage. For higher values
there is an effect on the wage, the capital/labor ratio and employment.
One other attribute of all the threat outcomes is worth noting. No matter
whether collective bargaining agreements are efficient or not, employment in the
presence of a threat can not be expected to be efficient. If threats raise prices
output will be too low.In most cases the threat will also affect the capital
labor ratio. Depending on the model analyzed and the nature of tastes and tech-
nology, employment can be either higher or lower in the presence of a threat than
without one.
The existence of inefficiency in employment relations raises the question
of whether there might not exist more efficient arrangements. If workers could
commit themselves not to engage in collective action then firms could require
workers to make such a commitment as a condition of employment and employment
relations would be efficient. However, such a commitment would be very difficult
to enforce. Defining collective action in a way such that courts could determine
whether or not it was taking place might be a problem. If a group of workers all
go out on strike clearly they are engaging in collective action. But, if groups
of workers call in sick it might be difficult to prove that any one worker was
taking part in a collective action and wasn't truly sick. The problem becomes
more difficult when collective action takes the form of work slowdowns, ttworking
to rules", or looking the other way when acts of sabotage are committed. Even
if courts could judge when an individual worker had violated a commitment not to
17engage in collective action, laws against involuntary service would make assessing
civil or criminal penalties difficult. This is one reason why under current U.S.
law "Yellow Dog" contracts, the commitment not to join a union, are not enforce-
able.
An alternative to having workers commit to not taking part in collective
action might be requiring them to buy sufficiently large shares in the firmso
that the potential gains from collective action are less than the costs. However,
such an arrangement would require most workers to invest avery large amount of
money in their firm. Many workers might not have enough wealth to allow them to
buy large enough shares of firms with high capitalized value per worker. Those
that did would still be forced to hold substantially undiversified portfolios.
Thus even if workers had the capital to buy large enough shares, the firmmight
have to offer a compensating wage differential for the extra risk the workers
would face. Given these considerations it seems possible that the least ineffi-
cient way for firms to deal with threats -- perhapsthe only feasible way -- is
to modify wages, capital intensity and employment in theways described earlier
in this section.
III.THE THREAT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE.
Perhapsthe most vexing question economists face is why unemployed workers
are unable to bid down the wages of employed workers and obtain jobs. Both ef-
ficiency wage theory and the threat of collective action can explain this phe-
nomena. Once this most compelling reason for expecting large pro-cyclical changes
18in real wages is dealt with it becomes easier to explain theremaining puzzles
of why wages move so little and employment moves so much over the businesscycle.
The movement of both nominal and real wages over the business cycleare a
puzzle.
In the medium run -- comparingwages from one year to the next -- itis real
wages which seem to move very little. The aggregate time series evidence on real
wage variability is mixed, but a recent study of individuals' wages suggests this
conclusion. Bils (1985) finds that for people who do not change jobs,wages rise
only about .6% for every 1% decrease in the unemployment rate. This would imply
an extremely high short run elasticity of labor supply if it was taken to indicate
movement in the reservation wage of the marginal worker. However, in the threat
model that need not be the interpretation.
The model of the effect of the threat of collective action in a competitive
product market gives some insight into why wages may not vary much over the
business cycle. Although it is a static model and capacity is determined ini-
tially to be exactly equal to the firm's share of total demand, one could imagine
a dynamic model which was a sequence of short runs like the static model. In a
simple competitive model wages equal the reservation wage of the marginal worker
in each period. That wage will fluctuate with market demand for labor.In the
threat model reservation wages were relevant to the determination of the firm's
wage only to the extent that they determined the workers' threat point in the Nash
bargain. There are several reasons why the wages paid by firms which wish to avoid
collective bargaining may not vary proportionaly with the reservationwage.
First, from equation (6) it is aparent that if w>r the elasticity of the wage with
respect to the reservation wage is less than one even if workers receive the full
reservation wage in the event that no bargain is reached (a1). There are also
19several good reasons to believe that the threat point will not vary one-for-one
with the reservation wage.
If the relevant threat for the workers is a short strike then we might expect
that they would not seek outside employment and their threat point would not de-
pend on the reservation wage (a0). Even if striking workers do eventually seek
outside employment to the extent that they spend some of the time out of work or
working only part time the threat point will vary less than one-for-one with the
reservation wage (a<l).Alternatively, if the relevant threat is to shut down
the plant or to force the firm to replace its entire workforce, workers might
expect to be unemployed for some period of time. Since unemployment compensation
does not change with the business cycle (or if it does it tends to be more generous
when many people are unemployed) the reservatoion wage in a full model of a labor
market with firms paying avoidance wages may not vary pro-cyclicaly or if it does
the variation may be muted)3
In a monopoly firm, both the reservation wage and the firmts ability to pay
will most likely be pro-cyclical. However, if the firm chooses to avoid collec-
tive bargaining by choosing a point on the downward sloping segment of the
avoidance constraint then the effect of this variability on wages will be ambig-
uous.For example, consider the case where coalitions may discriminate and
transfer and 9B/aK=O.An increase in demand for the firms product will most
likely cause the BC.) frontier to shift out, (B(L,K)-rL) to increase and the
threat constraint to shift out in the way shown in figure 7. Since such a firm
is setting marginal revenue product equal to r-c if the change in the BC.) func-
tion is due to a change which does not affect the reservation wage, and capital
isntt variable in the short run, employment will increase as the MRPL shifts out.
Wages may either decrease or increase depending on the size of the changes in B
and MRPL. Point F shows an increase in employment and a small increase in wages.
20If the reservation wage increases the effect on employment is also indeterminate,
although if employment stays the same or declines the wage must increase.This
result is similar to one obtained by McDonald and Solow (1981) for the case of
bargained wages. For the most part increases in demand can be expected to in-
crease employment but not necessarily wages. Over the business cycle there may
be little or no change in wages in firms choosing this sort of threat avoidance
strategy.
A partial explanation for the rigidity of nominal wages in the short run can
also come out of a model such as this. Experience tells us that nominal wages
are seldom adjusted more than once or twice a year for nearly all jobs.In the
short ran of most macro-economic analysis (one quarter) most wages do not change.
Adjustment costs are an inadequate explanation if one is thinking in terms of the
standard competitive model of the labor market since firms which do not adjust
their wages up would be unable to hire and would loose their current workforce,and
firms which do not adjust their wages down would be passing up large potential
profit gains. A modification of the collective action threat model can make the
adjustment costs explanation more believeable.
In the standard model of the competitive labor market where firms are wage
takers if a firm fails to adjust wages downward when the market wage falls it
suffers a loss of potential profits which are first order in the change in the
market wage. If a firm fails to adjust its wages up when the market wage increases
it will not be able to hire new workers, it will loose its curent workers and it
will suffer a profit loss which is of order zero in the change in the market wage.
But if wages are being kept high to avoid collective bargaining and firms do not
know the location of the collective action avoidance constraint with complete
certainty, losses in expected profits from a failure to adjust wages are only
second order in the difference'between current wages and desired wages. Thus if
21there are costs to adjustment, or if employers are less than perfectly rational,
nominal wages need not adjust to all changes in business conditions since rela-
tively large divergences of wages from optimal values need not result in large
losses of expected profits. This is a property the threat model shares with many
types of efficiency wage models and with models of monopsony labor markets.
Formal models of this sort of behavior can be found in Akerlof and Yellen (1985
a,b&c) and Mankiw (1985).
IV.CONCLUSION.
Thispaper has analyzed the threat of collective action by workers on wages
and employment. It was assumed that by forming a coalition of a fixed fraction
of a firms workforce workers could negotiate a contract with the firm which
specified who would be employed and the size and distribution of the wage-bill.
In order to avoid collective action by its workers the firm had to pay its workers
a wage equal to what they would receive under the best collective bargaining
agreement minus the cost to the workers of organizing. Several solutions to this
problem were illustrated. It was shown that a threat could affect only employ-
ment, or both wages and employment. A threat could either increase or decrease
employment and would almost always distort investment decisions.
If wages are affected the threat of collective action may help explain why
unemployed workers can not bid real wages down to obtain employment and why real
wages are relatively unresponsive to changes in the level of employment over the
business cycle.Firms may pay high wages to avoid collective action by their
22employees. People who were hired to work for a lower wage would have no incentive
not to attempt to organize to bargain collectively. That many firms do choose
this solution to the threat avoidance problem is suggested by Foulkes 1980 study
of the personelle policies of large nonunion firms. After noting that other as-
pects of employment besides pay are also important he concludes
"...itis a fair statement to say that the companies
studied do work hard to ensure that they are not
vulnerable to a union organizational drive on the
basis of pay or benefit issues. Labor relations
considerations were found to play a key role in
the setting of pay and benefit policies." (p149)
To implement this policy he notes that, "Union settlements, particularly those
of direct competitors are watched very carefully," (p166). Union settlements in
the local labor market might be thought to convey information about the cost of
obtaining certain types of labor, but the wages paid by competitors are only
relevant if workers deciding to engage in collective action are considering the
firm's ability to pay.
Dickens and Katz (1985) review a wide variety of evidence on industry and
occupational wage differences. They conclude that of all theories which might
account for the observed patterns the threat of collective action is one of two
which are most consistent with the evidence. A considerable amount of evidence
is reviewed, but one finding in particular suggests the relevance of the threat
model. Even after controlling for a wide variety of individual and geographic
variables there are very large correlations (most in the range of .75 to 1) be-
tween the average wages for nonunion workers in any two occupations across in-
dustries. If any occupation in an industry is highly paid relative to other
industries other occupations in that industry are also very likely to be highly
paid. This is difficult to reconcile with theories which attribute industry wage
differences to unobserved ability, compensating wage differentials, or efficiency
23wages paid to prevent shirking or quiting since special skill needs, working
conditions, turnover costs and monitoring problems should not be common to all
occupations in an industry. However, it follows naturally from a threat theory
of wage determination since all wages in an industry would depend on the common
factor of profits per worker.
Besides explaining inter-industry wage differences the threat of collective
action may help explain the existence of the dual labor market both across and
within industries. There exists a large descriptive literature on labor market
segmentation (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Edwards 1979, Berger and Piore 1980).
Recently Dickens and Lang (l985a,b&c) have provided statistical evidence which
supports both the descriptive value of the dual market view and the rationing of
high wage jobs implied by the theory of threat effects on wages.
Given the success of the threat effect in explaining these empirical puzzles
it may be worth briefly considering what some of the policy implications of such
a model might be. Four aspects in particular deserve comment. Bulow and Summers
(1985) and Jones (1985) have pointed out that in a dual economy resulting from
one sector paying efficiency wages, employment in the efficiency wage sector is
necessarily sub-optimal. Further, increased international competition in either
or both of the sectors can lead to a decrease in high-wage employment -- possibly
even its disappearance. The same could also be true of a union sector if unions
and firms do not negotiate efficient contracts, or a sector affected by a threat
of collective action if employment is being set so that the marginal product of
labor is greater than the reservation wage. The threat of collective actionor
the existence of unions introduces the possibility that, independent of the ef-
ficiency of employment relations, the firm's choice of the capital stock will be
distorted. Thus efficiency wage models, the existence of a union sector, or the
possibility that the threat of collective action requires high wages in some
24sectors may all provide an economic rationale for industrial and/or trade policies
to subsidize employment or investment in these sectors.
Another consideration also parallels the efficiency wage literature. Akerlof
and Yellen (l985a,b&c) have shown how small deviations from optimal wage setting
can lead to large deviations from optimality in the aggregate. Their model shows
that each firmts share of the aggregate welfare loss can be several orders of
magnitude larger than its forgone gain. This suggests a way that policies which
affect aggregate demand could be welfare enhancing. Their models also provide
an explanation for the existence of nominal rigidities in the short run and
therefore have implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
A third consideration is implications for policies to enhance racial equality.
It has been noted that blacks and other minorities have a more difficult time
finding primary sector employment (Dickens and Lang l985a,b&c). Several studies
have suggested that blacks have stronger pro-union sympathies than whites.
(Farber and Saks 1980, Dickens 1983).It is argued that this is because the
structure unions impose on the employment relation make it harder for supervisors
to discriminate against blacks. Thus blacks may have a lower c value and primary
firms may wish to avoid hiring them for that reason. If this is the case, laws
prohibiting discrimination in hiring and affirmative action laws requiring pri-
mary sector employers to increase the representation of blacks among their
workforce can increase racial equality with little or no loss of efficiency.
One final point deserves discussion. In the simple competitive model de-
creasing worker bargaining power or increasing the cost of collective action could
lower wages and prices and improve economic efficiency. This might seem to sug-
gest that changes in the law to cause such changes in labor relations are desir-
able. However, if firms have monopoly power the situation is considerably more
complicated. Recent work by Freeman (1984) and Karier (1984) showing that unions
25reduce profits in concentrated industries, and themany studies showing a corre-
lation between market power and wages (surveyed in Long and Link,1983) suggests
that monopoly power is an important factor inwage determination. In such firms,
changes in worker bargaining power and the costs of organizingmay either increase
or decrease efficiency. Further, they affect the distribution of income between
workers, entrepreneurs and capitalists in a complicated way. Theymay also affect
the likelihood that unions will form.If unions promote productivity, as some
authors have argued, if they negotiate more efficient levels ofemployment than
are possible in the presence of a threat, or if they are desirable for political
reasons -- forthe representation they give to the interests of workers -- then
again the analysis is considerably more difficult. Finally, itmay be possible
to reduce the ease with which overt collective bargaining is initiated but dif-
ficult to increase the cost of other forms of collective action. Overtbargaining
may be more costly to the firm but less costly to society if there are fewer
disruptions of production. This was one rationale for thepassage of the National
Labor Relations Act. The analysis of such questions wouldseem to provide fertile
ground for future research. The threat of collective action must be considered
when analyzing the welfare effects of government policies towardslabor unions
and labor relations.
26Vu. FOOTNOTES.
1.In 1984 only 16.1% of the civilian labor force were members of a union orem-
ployee association (Troy and Sheflin, 1985).
2. This work builds on work by Ulman (forthcoming) which discusses the union
threat effect and its potential superiority to efficiencywage models for ex-
plaining many labor market phenomena.
3. See Yellen [1984] for a review of the efficiency wage literature.
4. The wage should be interpreted as encompassing all aspects of compensation,
pecuniary and non-pecuniary.
5. A more general model might allow firms to choose c subject to constraints
dictated by technology and the law. For the purposes of the analysis presented
here consideration of such possibilities complicates the model without
substantively affecting the results.
6. It is assumed here the set of possible contracts is independent of the firms
choice of wages and employment. This would not be true if the outcome of the
bargaining game by which the firm and unionarriveat a contract depends on the
starting position.
7. The firm might wish to threaten not to allow certain wage patterns when the
union is organizing. But if we assume that the contracts are perfect equilibrium
of the bargaining game, workers will know when they are organizing that the firm
will not carry out threats to block a wage distribution in bargaining since once
the union is formed only the size of the wage-bill matters.
8. These assumptions are meant as stylized reflections of real world practices.
Examples of discrimination in favor of founding coalitions may include the payment
of high wages to certain types of workers (skilled workers, more senior workers,
workers in certain jobs) or two tier wage systems where newly hired workers are
paid less than those already employed.Examples of transfers to unemployed
workers are supplemental unemployment insurance and severance pay.Fifty-one
percent of all major collective bargaining agreements have income maintenance
provisions such as work guarantees, severance pay or supplemental UI benefits
(BNA, 1983). Although most severance pay arrangements provide only a few months
salary, if the wage premium from collective bargaining is a small fraction of the
reservation wage the payment could equal several years of the differential.
9. Under many assumptions about the derivation of the B(.) locus, whether or not
the union discriminates and engages in transfers will affect the locus. The two
considerations are separated here only for expositional purposes. This assumption
does not imply that they would not be related if we were considering how the B(.)
locus is determined. Also, even when it is assumed that collective bargaining
VII. Footnotes. 27agreements do not discriminate against non-members it will still be possible for
them to discriminate in favor of those to whom the employer paid a higher wage.
10. This assumes that unions can make binding commitments to more highly paid
members of the pro-union coalition to continue to pay them high wages after a
union is in place. This is not a problem if the coalition must be maintained to
keep the union. But if it is harder to get a union out than to get it in there
may be a problem with unions making commitments to high paid coalition members.
In particular, such arrangements could not be a perfect equilibrium with identical
workers if each union organized only one firm. Once the union got in it would
have no incentive to honor its promise. However, if a union wishes to be able
to continue to organize other firms its reputation of keeping its promises to past
groups of workers it has organized may be a sufficient incentive to make it keep
its promises.
11. By assuming perfect information we assume that all workers know who will be
laid off in the event of a reduction in force. If layoffs were random and workers
were risk neutral the union would choose a contract with LLandwage equal to
B(L ,K)/L .Ifworkers were risk averse the ideal contract would offer a higher
level of employment.
12. Assuming that the initial choice of the size of the capital stock does not
influence the wage bill, first order conditions for profit maximization in this
case require that
R'(L) =B1(vL,K)-c.
For example, if negotiated employment and wage levels are on the labor demand








Thus for many parameter values --includingany where v >.5--suchan internal
tangency between the constraint and the iso-profit curve is impossible since L
would have to be negative.
On the other hand, if
B(L) =s(R(L)-rL)+rL,
that is the workers receive some constant share (s) of the surplus at any level
of employment, then
VII. Footnotes. 28B'(L) =(l-s)r+sR'(L),
first order conditions require
R'(L) -sR'(vL)=(l-s)r-c
and tangencies may be possible.
13. McDonald and Solow (1984) analyze a model of a labor market where some firms
pay bargained wages and some firms pay a competitive wage. Even when they assume
that laid-off workers from the high wage sector take employment in the competitve
sector they still find that cyclical movements in bargained wages may be signif-
icantly damped.
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To see that going from a situation where the avoidance of collective action
is not a binding constraint to a situation where it is can cause either a decrease
or increase in the capital labor ratio consider the following example. The col-
lective action avoidance constraint is just binding and increasing worker bar-
gaining power will force the firm to pay a wage above the reservation wage.In
this case the firm wishes to minimize costs (k+w)/f(k) subject to the constraint
that the wage is no less than c less thanwc from equation 5 in the text. Sub-
stituting this constraint into the cost function, taking the derivative with re-
spect to the capital/labor ratio and simplifying yields the first order condition
(l-bd)-(l-b)pf'(k) =0. (Al)
To determine how the capital/labor ratio of all firms in the market will react
to an increase in worker bargaining power (b) we substitute costs for the market
price in Al and the collective action avoidance constraint (equation 6 from the
text) for the wagge in costs to yield
3k/sb =(arf'-d(f-kf')/((l-b)(w+k)f''). (A2)
The denominator is negative and the term (f-f'k) is positive by the assumption
of diminishing returns to capital in the production function. Thus the entire
expression may be either positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of the
terms in the numerator. Increasing the bargaining power to create a union threat
can either increase or decrease the capital labor ratio.
Appendix 1 32APPENDIX 2
Thefollowing numeric example illustrates all three of the solutions to the
firm'smaximization problem in the competitive model.To begin with, assume a
Cobb-Douglas production function with a capital coefficient of 2/3. In addition
assume a reservation wage (r) of 5, a cost of organizing (c) of .05, that workers
get .6 of the reservation wage when a bargain is not reached (a) and the firm can
recover half the value of its capital investment (d).In this case, if the
workers' bargaining power (b) is between 0 and .293 there will be no effective
threat, the capital/labor ratio (k) will be set to 10 and unit costs will be 3.23.
If bargaining power is .3 or greater, but less than about .54 the firm will reduce
the capital labor ratio while keeping the wage equal to the reservation wage.
In this range both the reservation wage and the collective action avoidance con-
straints are binding. With bargaining power above .54 only the collective action
avoidance constraint is binding, wages are above the reservation wage and the
capital labor ratio continues to decrease as bargaining power increases.
Figures A2.l and A2.2 illustrate the behavior of the wage and the
capital/labor ratio as b increases. In figure A2.1 the X line indicates the be-
havior of the capital labor ratio. The line denoted by the boxes shows the capital
labor ratio for the situation where only the reservation wage is binding. This
is computed by solving for the first order conditions for profit maximization when
the wage is given so k.667r/(1-.667)=lO. The line denoted by the +s shows the
upper bound on the capital/labor ratio if the firm is paying the reservation wage.
It is computed by solving the collective action avoidance constraint for k as-
suming that wr5. The line denoted by the diamonds shows the maximum value for
the capital labor ratio if the firm is paying the wage specified by the collective
action avoidance constraint. It is computed by solving the first order conditions
for profit maximization when the firm views w as a choice variable. Substituting
equation (6) from the text for w in the firm's profit function and taking the




where (w+k)/f(k) has been substituted in for p. To obtain the profit maximizing
value for k when only the collective action avoidance constraint is binding one
substitutes equation (6) in for w again and solves for k to obtain
(A2.2) k2[(1-b)ar-c]/(1-bd)
For values of worker bargaining power below .3 the reservation wage constraint
is binding and the firm chooses the optimal capital/labor ratio of 10. Above .3
but below about .54 both the collective action avoidance constraint and the res-
ervation wage constraints are binding. When worker bargaining power is above .54
the firms are better off paying wages above the reservation wage and keeping a
slightly higher capital labor ratio relative to the capital labor ratio they would
have to choose if they wish to continue to pay the reservation wage and avoid
collective action.
In figure A2.2 the line denoted by Xs represents the wage paid by firms as
a function of worker bargaining power. The reservation wage constraint is binding
up to the point where worker bargaining power is about .54. When bargaining power
Appendix 2 33is above that level it is more efficient for the firm to increase wages than to
keep them equal to the reservation wage and to continue to decrease the
capital/labor ratio. The line denoted by the boxes shows the wage the firm would
have to pay to avoid collective bargaining if it maintained a capital/labor ratio
of 10 --theoptimal capital/labor ratio in the absence of a threat it is computed
using equation (6) from the text assuming k10. The line denoted by the diamonds
is the collective action avoidance wage with the capital labor ratio choosen ac-
cording to equation A2.2 above.
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